What Happened to the First Amendment: The \u3ci\u3eMetromedia\u3c/i\u3e Case by Cameron, Elizabeth H.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 13
Issue 3 Spring 1982 Article 4
1982
What Happened to the First Amendment: The
MetromediaCase
Elizabeth H. Cameron
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth H. Cameron, What Happened to the First Amendment: The Metromedia Case, 13 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 463 (1982).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol13/iss3/4
NOTES
What Happened to the First Amendment:
The Metromedia Case
INTRODUCTION
When the United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdic-
tion over Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,' many national
associations, public interest groups, and state and local govern-
ments expected that the Court's ruling would clarify the extent to
which governmental units could regulate commercial speech.' In
that case, two billboard companies had appealed a California Su-
preme Court decision upholding San Diego's outdoor advertising
ordinance.3 The companies had unsuccessfully argued that the
city's ordinance, which prohibited most outdoor advertising signs,
violated the free speech clause of the first amendment.
The first amendment issue was particularly important because of
the general confusion concerning the status of commercial speech.
Although the United States Supreme Court had recently held that
commercial speech was entitled to constitutional protection,5 the
Court also had stated that commercial speech did not merit the
1. 453 U.S. 490 (1980).
2. The case produced a number of amicus curiae briefs arguing both sides of this issue.
Parties listed in connection with the case at the U.S. Supreme Court level include: the
United States, Pacifica Legal Foundation, American Newspaper Publishers Association,
American Civil Liberties Union, City of Alameda, City of Champaign-Urbana, State of Ha-
waii, State of Vermont, State of Maine, City of San Francisco, County of San Francisco,
National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, and Outdoor Advertising Association.
3. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510
(1980). For case comments on the California Supreme Court's treatment of Metromedia,
see, Note, Aesthetics, the First Amendment, and the Realities of Billboard Control, 9
ECOLOGY L.Q. 295 (1981); Note, City- Wide Prohibition of Billboards: Police Power and the
Freedom of Speech, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1597 (1979); Recent Developments, Zoning, Bill-
boards, and the Exercise of the Police Power of Aesthetics, 47 TENN. L. REV. 901 (1981).
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. I provides in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging freedom of speech or of the press."
5. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976). For a discussion of the case see infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
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same degree of protection as noncommercial speech. 6 For this rea-
son, courts were unsure about what constitutional test to apply in
determining the validity of commercial speech regulations.7 Adding
to the difficulty was the absence of any clear statement as to how
commercial speech should be defined.'
The Supreme Court decided Metromedia on July 2, 1981. Since
then the decision has been greeted with confusion and uncertainty.
It has been reported in various publications, 9 yet not explained.
Perhaps this should not be surprising due to the peculiar align-
ment of the Court and the outcome of the case. Although six jus-
tices concluded that San Diego's ordinance violated the first and
fourteenth amendments, their varied approaches make it impossi-
ble to predict what kinds of restrictions on commercial speech may
be upheld in the future.10 In analyzing Metromedia, this note will
6. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). For a
discussion of the case see infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
7. State and federal courts had applied a variety of inconsistent balancing tests. See,
e.g., John Donnelley & Sons v. Mallar, 453 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Me. 1978), rev'd sub nom.
John Donnelley & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1980)(lower court upheld regula-
tion under commercial speech test); Combined Communications Corp. v. City and County of
Denver, 542 P.2d 79 (Colo. 1975) (invalidating a city-wide ban on billboards using a reasona-
bleness standard); John Donnelley & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709
(Mass. 1975)(upholding a city-wide ban using a reasonableness standard); Suffolk Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 43 N.Y.2d 483, 373 N.E.2d 263, 402 N.Y.S.2d 368, appeal dis-
missed, 439 U.S. 808 (1978)(ban upheld under commercial speech test); Daikeler v. Zoning
Board of Adjustment of Montgomery Township, 1 Pa. Commw. Ct. 445, 275 A.2d 696
(1971)(invalidating a city-wide ban using a strict scrutiny test).
8. The Supreme Court has variously defined commercial speech in terms of whether its
purpose is commercial, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943); and as speech
that does no more than propose a commercial transaction, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pitts-
burgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); and as speech motivated by a
desire for personal gain, Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951).
For purposes of this article, the term commercial speech will be used to refer only to
"speech of any form that advertises a product or service for profit or for [a] business pur-
pose." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & I.N. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 767 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG].
9. See R. Young Billboard Advertising Decision Indecisive, 67 A.B.A.J. 1350, 1362-63
(1981); Note, Metromedia v. City of San Diego, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. (Sept. 1981).
Billboard Regs Hit, L.A. Daily J., p. 1, col. 6 (July 6, 1981); Are Billboards Protected by the
First Amendment? L.A. Daily J., p. 4, col. 4 (Oct. 2, 1981); See also, The Supreme Court
1979 Term: Freedom of Speech, 95 HARv. L. REv. 93, 211-21 (1981) (discussing Metromedia
and sharply criticizing the plurality opinion).
10. A handful of courts have cited Metromedia in support of tentative and conflicting
propositions. See Metromedia, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 538 F. Supp.
1183 (D. Md. 1980) (invalidating city billboard ordinance on the basis of the plurality hold-
ing); May v. People, 636 P.2d 672, 675 (Colo. 1981) (citing Metromedia for the rule that a
litigant with commercial speech interests may assert the noncommercial speech interests of
others); Norton Outdoor Advertising v. Village of Arlington Heights, 69 Ohio St. 2d 539, 433
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present a brief overview of traditional limitations on the regulation
of noncommercial speech and the manner in which the Court has
applied these limitations to the regulation of commercial speech. It
will describe the background of Metromedia and the inconsistent
bases of the Supreme Court's opinions. The effect of the Court's
decision on the content neutrality doctrine and on the Court's
traditional first amendment balancing tests will then be examined.
The note will conclude with a statement of the reasons why the
several opinions have departed significantly from traditional first
amendment principles.
BACKGROUND: THE SCOPE OF THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE
Limitations on Regulating Protected Speech
Notwithstanding its pre-eminent position among constitutionally
protected values, the right to individual self-expression is often in
direct conflict with a government's right to enact general legisla-
tion for the public welfare. This conflict is most often present at
the local level and has existed since the Supreme Court held that
the free speech clause of the first amendment applied to the
states.' 1 To resolve this conflict, the Court has developed a set of
guidelines and tests to assist local governments in determining
when and how they may regulate various forms of speech. Underly-
ing these guidelines and tests is the broad principle that govern-
mental regulations should not be used to suppress freedom of
expression. 2
The requirement that a regulatory measure be content neutral is
N.E.2d 198 (1982) (applying the plurality's bifurcated approach to invalidate a billboard
ordinance, but concluding that aesthetic and traffic safety interests do not justify a ban on
commercial speech); Maurice Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 427 N.E. 2d
25 (Mass. App. 1981) (applying only a commercial speech test to uphold a billboard regula-
tion). See also, City of Lakewood v. Colfax Unlimited Ass'n, 634 P.2d 62 (Colo. 1981) (inval-
idating the sign code of the city ordinance). The court observed that a total of five justices
in Metromedia held that a municipality may value some commercial messages more highly
than others. Id. at 67. The court also chose to rely partially on Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion that content based distinctions will only be allowed upon a showing of compelling
interest. Id. at 69.
11. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
12. Members of the Court resorted to numerous images and phrases to explain the im-
portance of this principle. Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (a con-
cern for avoiding potentially "chilling" or "freezing" effects of restraints on expression);
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (commitment to "uninhibited, roliust,
and wide-open" public discussion); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (a
reflection of the belief that "the best test of truth is the power ... to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market").
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one means of safeguarding this central, first amendment principle.
The doctrine of content neutrality expresses the judicial belief that
governmental regulations on speech may not be used to suppress
the proliferation of ideas or to assess the merits of particular view-
points." By its very nature, a regulation affecting the content of
speech requires a governmental value judgment and thus, to some
degree, may be used to suppress ideas which a government deems
unacceptable." Conversely, a regulation on speech which is based
upon some nonideological attribute of speech poses less of a threat
to traditional first amendment freedoms.18 Hence, it will be af-
forded more deferential treatment by a court.
The importance of content neutrality in first amendment analy-
sis is evidenced by the fact that it is a prerequisite for application
of the Court's most deferential balancing test. This test, known as
the time, place, and manner rule, allows a local government to re-
strict expression if (1) it has important reasons for doing so, and
(2) the restrictions are applied in a neutral fashion, without regard
to content. The Court formulated the time, place, and manner rule
in Cox v. New Hampshire1 when it upheld a state statute that
13. The Court's first statements of this principle appeared in its earliest first amend-
ment cases. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring) Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
See generally, G. ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST: NOTES ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1971); Z. CHAFER, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941); NowAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG,
supra note 8 at 711-22; Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. Cm. L.
REV. 461 (1953); for a discussion of the historical and philosophical purposes of the first
amendment.
14. The Court made its strongest statement of the content neutrality doctrine in Police
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). Chicago's ordinance prohibited all picketing,
except for peaceful picketing, in front of schools during school hours. Justice Marshall, writ-
ing for the majority, struck the ordinance and stated that there was an "equality of status in
the field of ideas," adding that "government may not grant the use of a forum to people
whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or
more controversial views." Id. at 95-96.
See also Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 20 (1975). The author views Mosley as a landmark decision, affirming the importance
of content neutrality as a fundamental principle of first amendment law. For a contrary
view, see Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV.
113 (1981).
15. In Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961), Justice Harlan stated
that "general regulatory statutes, not intending to control the content of speech but inciden-
tally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the First or
Fourteenth Amendments forbade Congress or the States to pass, when they have been justi-
fied by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which
has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interest involved." Id. at 50-51.
16. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
[Vol. 13
Metromedia Case
required persons to obtain licenses before holding a public meeting
or parade. The Court held that a government could exercise its po-
lice powers to restrict speech so long as the restriction was nar-
rowly drawn and contained no elements of substantive censorship
or discrimination.17
A regulation on protected speech which cannot be classified as a
time, place, and manner restriction is judged by a much stricter
balancing test. Under this second, stricter test, a regulation on pro-
tected speech will be upheld against a first amendment challenge
only if a government shows: (1) that it has compelling interest in
restricting speech; (2) that the restrictions directly further such an
interest; and (3) that any more narrowly drawn restrictions will
frustrate its interest. 8 This test is applied to strike regulations
which are content-based. 9 It is also applied to strike regulations
which are overly broad or vague in distinguishing between pro-
tected and unprotected speech,20 and to regulations which com-
pletely prohibit one form of protected speech.2" The Court de-
mands a greater showing of governmental necessity in these
situations because the restriction on freedom of expression is sig-
17. Id. at 576-77.
18. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (protection of peace and order
not a compelling interest for barring religous proselytizing); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939)(ban on handbills does not directly further prevention of littering); Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938) (prohibition against distribution of literature not narrowly drawn).
19. See e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)(picketing). See also
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (ban on rock musical "Hair");
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)(mass demonstrations); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268 (1951)(parades); Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 296 (1940)(religious proselytiz-
ing); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)(license for handbills).
20. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)(political activities of govern-
ment employee). See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)(films with
nudity); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975)(city theater ban on
rock musical "Hair"); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969)(picketing
and parading); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958)(solicitation); Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290 (1951)(public meetings); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)(labor
picketing); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)(religious proselytizing); Hague v.
C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939)(handbills).
Like the doctrine of content neutrality, the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness are
intended to insure that a regulation on protected speech does not unduly inhibit freedom of
expression. See generally NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 8 at 722-27; Note, The
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844 (1970); Note, The Void;-for-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 110-13 (1960).
21. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981)(live nude dancing)
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)(films with nudity); Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558 (1948)(loudspeakers); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943)(handbills); Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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nificant. This second, "strict scrutiny" balancing test greatly
reduces the chances that a governmental regulation will be upheld.
The time, place, and manner rule and the stricter balancing test
enable the Court to reconcile competing interests and, at the same
time, place limitations upon governmental regulation of speech.
The time, place, and manner rule reflects the judicial belief that
first amendment rights should give way to legitimate local regula-
tory interests where the restriction on protected speech is inciden-
tal. The stricter test, in turn, reflects the belief that governmental
regulations should not be used to unduly restrict or prohibit pro-
tected expression.
Since the limitations on governmental regulation of speech apply
only to speech which is protected by the first amendment, the
Court has frequently had to determine whether a particular form
of expression merits protection. Generally, the Court has decided
this question by looking to the purpose and function of the first
amendment. Sometimes the Court has emphasized the public in-
terest aspect of the first amendment, stating that the purpose of
free expression is to assure the availability of a wide range of polit-
ical, social and moral viewpoints.2 At other times, the Court has
emphasized that freedom of speech is a liberty interest intended to
protect the individual from governmental censorship of ideas .2 Al-
though both definitions are broad enough to include a wide range
of expression,' 4 until recently neither was thought to be broad
enough to include commercial speech.
22. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) in which the Court stated
that the purpose of free expression is to protect "all issues about which information is
needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
period." See also A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948); Anastaplo, Human Nature and the First Amendment, 40 U. Prrr. L. REv. 611
(1979).
23. See, e.g., Terminello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). The Court stated that
"[s]peech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconcep-
tions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. ... The
alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominent
political or community groups." Id. at 4-5. Some commentators have spoken of the first
amendment as incorporating the right to disobey. See, e.g., Bickel, Domesticated Civil Diso-
bedience: The First Amendment from Sullivan to the Pentagon Papers, in THE MORALrrY
OF CONSENT (1975).
24. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)(campaign contributions), Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969)(flag burning); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)(student protest with black armbands); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940)(labor picketing).
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Commercial Speech
The Court first considered a first amendment challenge to a
commercial speech regulation in Valentine v. Chrestensen2 The
defendant in Chrestensen had been convicted of violating an ordi-
nance which prohibited the distribution of advertisements on city
streets. The Court upheld the ordinance. In a unanimous decision,
the Court stated that purely commercial advertising was not enti-
tled to first amendment protection. 6
For more than thirty years, commercial speech remained unpro-
tected, in part on the theory that commercial advertising had little
to do with notions of self-government or with the exposition of
ideas.27 By the mid-1970s, however, the Court changed its tack and
overruled Chrestensen2 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council," the Court struck a state
statute which prohibited pharmacists from advertising the price of
subscription drugs, stating that the first amendment protected the
public's right to receive truthful information of a commercial na-
ture.3 0 The Court acknowledged the state's interest in protecting
the public against deceptive advertising, but concluded that such
an interest did not justify the complete suppression of commercial
information of importance to consumers.3'
Although the decision in Virginia Pharmacy significantly broad-
ened the scope of the first amendment, it did not alter traditonal
first amendment analysis. After concluding that commercial speech
25. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
26. Id. at 54.
27. In denying commercial speech first amendment protection, the Court was essentially
balancing the value of the communication against the governmental interest. A similar bal-
ancing approach was involved in the Court's decisions to deny protection to other forms of
speech. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel and defamation);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964) (libel and defamation); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity).
28. Without directly overruling Chrestensen, the Court had been qualifying the commer-
cial speech doctrine for some time in an effort to protect noncommercial expression which
arose in the context of commercial advertising or commercial transactions. Compare e.g.,
Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951)(door-to-door sale of magazine subscrip-
tions is commercial speech) with Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)(sale of reli-
gious books is not commercial speech). See also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964')(political advertising is protected when its primary purpose is not commercial) and
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)(newspaper advertisements conveying information
about legal out-of-state abortions are not solely commercial speech since they contain infor-
mation of public interest and relate to a constitutionally protected activity).
29. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
30. Id. at 762-65.
31. Id. at 770.
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was a protected form of expression, the Court discussed whether to
apply the time, place, and manner test or the stricter test. It stated
that the time, place, and manner test was inappropriate because
the Virginia statute completely prohibited a form of protected
speech on the basis of content.8 2 Applying the stricter test, the
Court invalidated the statute, concluding that Virginia had not
shown that its statute was narrowly drawn to serve a compelling
interest.33
The Court reaffirmed its Virginia Pharmacy holding in Linmark
Associates v. Township of Willingboro.34 Willingboro had passed
an ordinance which prohibited the posting of for-sale signs. The
township argued that the ordinance was a time, place, and manner
restriction on commercial speech, but the Court viewed the ordi-
nance as a content-based prohibition. 5 In a unanimous decision,
the Court struck the ordinance, holding that the township had
failed to satisfy the stricter first amendment standard of review.3 6
Both Virginia Pharmacy and Linmark illustrated the potential
difficulties of including commercial speech within the protection of
the first amendment. The doctrine of content neutrality, as well as
the traditional balancing tests, presented a formidable barrier to
most types of commercial regulations. Although the Court had
never expressly stated that commercial speech was to be equated
with noncommercial, ideological speech,3 7 application of the first
amendment tests had the effect of protecting both types to the
same extent. In an effort to remedy this difficulty, some members
of the Court began to search for a way to restrict the protections
32. Id. at 771.
33. Id. at 773.
34. 431 U.S. 85. (1977).
35. Id. at 93-94.
36. Id. at 95-97.
37. Justice Stewart emphasized this point in his concurring opinion in Virginia Phar-
macy. "The Court's determination that commercial advertising of the kind at issue here is
not 'wholly outside the protection of' the First Amendment indicates by its very phrasing
that there are important differences between commercial price and product advertising, on
the one hand, and ideological communication on the other." 425 U.S. at 779. See also Justice
Powel's majority opinion in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447 (1978). "To
require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike
could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's guaran-
tee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject the First Amendment to
such a devitalizaton, we instead have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of pro-
tection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,
while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommer-
cial expression." Id. at 456.
[Vol. 13
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afforded commercial speech 3 8 The result of their efforts was set
forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission."9
In Central Hudson the Court was faced with a statute which di-
vided utility. advertising into two categories: informational and
promotional. The statute allowed informational advertising, but
prohibited promotional advertising in order to encourage public
conservation of fuel. Although eight justices struck the ban on pro-
motional advertising, they were divided in their reasoning. Justice
Powell, writing for a majority,40 stated that information intended
to encourage the purchase of goods or services should be subject to
less protection than other constitutionally guaranteed expression.41
After emphasizing that commercial speech had never been
equated with noncommercial speech, Justice Powell stated that a
third, intermediate balancing test could be formulated from the
Court's recent commercial speech decision. 4' The new test con-
sisted of four parts: (1) If the regulated expression concerns a law-
ful activity and is not misleading, then the regulation will be valid
if it (2) furthers a substantial governmental interest; (3) directly
advances that interest; and (4) reaches no further than necessary
to accomplish the asserted interest.43 Applying this test to the stat-
ute, Justice Powell concluded that the commission had not shown
the regulation to be sufficiently narrow in scope.
Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice
Brennan, objected to applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to
the facts of the case. 45 He stated that the ban on promotional ad-
vertising should be treated like any other content-based prohibi-
tion on protected speech and subjected to the strict standard of
first amendment review.46 In another concurring opinion, Justices
38. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979)(deceptive advertising is not pro-
tected by the first amendment); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)(over-
breadth doctrine is not available to invalidate commercial advertising); Pittsburgh Press Co.
v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)(commercial speech related
to an illegal activity is not protected).
39. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
40. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall, Stewart,
and White.
41. 447 U.S. at 562-63.
42. Id. at 564-66.
43. Id. at 566.
44. Id. at 571.
45. Id. at 573.
46. Id. at 573-74.
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Stevens and Brennan objected to categorizing the regulation as a
commercial speech regulation. 7 Justice Stevens warned that if
commercial speech were defined too broadly, traditional first
amendment expression would be included in the definition and
then balanced away under a relaxed standard of review.48
The differences between the majority and the two concurring
opinions in Central Hudson were irreconcilable. The majority
sought to develop a special category of commercial speech law, dis-
tinct from traditional first amendment law and with its own sepa-
rate rules and standards. The concurring justices were convinced
that commercial speech must be integrated into the existing body
of first amendment law. They were also concerned that the distinc-
tions between commercial and noncommercial speech might not be
able to be maintained without destroying traditional first amend-
ment protections.
The opinions in Central Hudson presaged the difficulties the
Court would have a year later in deciding the Metromedia case. If
local governments were held to a less stringent standard of review
when they regulated commercial speech, as opposed to any other
type of speech, then they would be able to suppress certain forms
of expression simply by labeling them as "commercial." Equally
troublesome was the question of whether the decision to grant
commercial speech first amendment protection had created too
great a barrier against legitimate local regulation. These were the
issues which the Court faced in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego.
THE Metromedia CASE
Background
San Diego enacted its outdoor advertising ordinance in 1972,
prior to the Court's commercial speech rulings.'" The city's stated
purpose was "to eliminate hazards to pedestrians and motorists
brought about by distracting sign displays" and "to preserve and
improve the appearance of the City.' 50 The ordinance prohibited
most off-site signs.51
47. Id. at 577.
48. Id. at 579-83.
49. In 1972, Valentine v. Chrestensen had not yet been overruled. See infra notes 25-28
and accompanying text.
50. SAN DIEGO, CAL. CODE, § 101.0700(A)(1972).
51. The pertinent provisions stated:
[Vol. 13
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This general prohibition was subject to two groups of exemp-
tions. The first exemption applied to on-site signs. The ordinance
expressly exempted signs which designated the owner or occupant
of the premises; identified the premises; or advertised on-site goods
or services.5' On-site signs with messages which did not fit into at
least one of these categories were prohibited.
The second set of exemptions applied to certain off-site signs
conveying noncommercial information. The ordinance listed twelve
categories of permissible off-site signs. 8 They included historical
The following signs shall be prohibited:
1. Any sign identifying a use, facility or service which is not located on the
premises.
2. Any sign identifying a product which is not produced, sold or manufactured on
the pemises.
3. Any sign which advertises or otherwise directs attention to a product, service or
activity, event, person, institution or business which may or may not be identified
by a brand name and which occurs or is generally conducted, sold, manufactured,
produced or offered elsewhere than on the premises where such sign is located.
Id. § 101.0700(B).
52. The specific language was set forth as follows:
Only those outdoor advertising display signs, hereinafter referred to as signs in
this Division, which are either signs designating the name of the owner or occu-
pant of the premises upon which such signs are placed, or identifying such prem-
ises; or signs advertising goods manufactured or produced or services rendered on
the premises upon which such signs are placed shall be permitted.
Id.
53. The ordinance exempted the following types of off-site signs:
1. Any sign erected and maintained pursuant to and in discharge of any govern-
mental function or required by any law, ordinance or governmental regulation.
2. Bench signs located at designated public transit bus stops; provided, however,
that such signs shall have any necessary permits required by Sections 62.0501 and
62.0502 of this Code.
3. Signs being manufactured, transported and/or stored within the City limits of
the City of San Diego shall be exempt; provided, however, that such signs are not
used, in any manner or form, for purposes of advertising at the place or places of
manufacture or storage.
4. Commemorative plaques of recognized historical societies and organizations.
5. Religious symbols, legal holiday decorations and identification emblems of re-
ligous orders or historical societies.
6. Signs located within malls, courts, arcades, porches, patios, and similar areas
where such signs are not visible from any point on the boundary of the premises.
7. Signs designating the premises for sale, rent or lease; provided, however, that
any such.sign shall conform to all regulations of the particular zone in which it is
located.
8. Public service signs limited to the depiction of time, temperature or news; pro-
vided, however, than any such sign shall conform to all regulations of the particu-
lar zone in which it is located.
9. Signs on vehicles regulated by the City that provide public transportation in-
cluding, but not limited to, buses and taxicabs.
10. Signs on licensed commercial vehicles, including trailers; provided, however,
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plaques, religious symbols, time-weather-news public service signs,
for-sale signs, for-lease signs, temporary political campaign signs,"
and signs relating to governmental functions. An off-site sign
which did not fit into one of the twelve categories was prohibited.
Two billboard companies, Metromedia, Inc. and Pacifica Out-
door Advertising Co., sued San Diego to enjoin enforcement of the
ordinance. They won a motion for summary judgment in the Cali-
fornia superior court,55 which the California appellate court af-
firmed.56 The California Supreme Court reversed, upholding the
ordinance as a valid time, place, and manner restriction on com-
mercial speech.57
that such vehicles shall not be utilized as parked or as stationary outdoor display
signs.
11. Temporary off-premise subdivision directional signs if permitted by a condi-
tional use permit granted by the Zoning Administrator.
12. Temporary political campaign signs, including their supporting structures,
which are erected or maintained for no longer than 90 days and which are re-
moved within 10 days after election to which they pertain.
Id. at § 101.0700(F).
54. The exemption for temporary political campaign signs was added in October, 1977,
after the Ninth Circuit ruling in Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360 (1976). The court
struck an ordinance regulating temporary political campaign signs as an unconstitutional
restriction on political speech. Telephone interview, Dec. 8, 1981, with city attorney Alan
Sumption.
55. The superior court found both due process and first amendment violations. Cited in
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 136 Cal. Rptr. 453, 456 (1977).
Two of the parties' Joint Stipulation of Facts were critical to the outcome of the case. The
first stated that, "If enforced as written, Ordinance No. 10795 will eliminate the outdoor
advertising business in the City of San Diego." Jt. Stip. of Facts (J.S.F.) No. 2. Id. at 455-56.
The second stipulation acknowledged that the ordinance applied not only to signs conveying
commercial advertising, but also to those conveying political or social information. Jt. Stip.
of Facts (J.S.F.) No. 28. Id.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to see that both stipulations seriously ham-
pered the city's ability to argue effectively that: (1) the ordinance was nothing more than a
time, place, and manner regulation which left open alternative means of communication;
and (2) only commercial speech was affected.
56. The appellate court discussed only the due process issue, holding that the city did
not have the authority to ban a lawful business without proof that it was harmful or a
public nuisance. 136 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
57. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr.
510 (1980). The California Supreme Court was careful to construe the ordinance as applying
only to a "permanent structure contituting or used for the display of a commercial or other
advertisement to the public." 26 Cal. 3d at 856 n.2. In this way, the court was able to state
that the ordinance was a time, place, and manner restriction, enforced without regard to
content. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' due process challenge, holding that the city's
aesthetic and safety objections were of sufficient importance to outweigh the companies'
economic interests. Id. at 863-66.
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The Supreme Court Opinions
In a plurality opinion, Justice White, joined by Justices Mar-
shall, Powell, and Stewart, characterized San Diego's ordinance as
a general prohibition against off-site advertising." Justice White
stated that the ordinance was not a total ban because it contained
exemptions, and it was not a time, place, and manner regulation
because the exemptions were partially based on content.59 He ex-
plained that both the stricter balancing test for noncommercial
speech and the commercial speech balancing test developed in
Central Hudson must be applied to determine the constitutional-
ity of the ordinance. He stated that this bifurcated approach was
necessary for two reasons. First, the parties had stipulated that
both commercial and noncommercial speech were affected by the
ordinance. Second, prior case law had established that commercial
speech was not entitled to the same protection as noncommercial
speech. 0
In considering the impact of the ordinance on commercial
speech, the plurality held that the city's interests outweighed the
asserted commercial speech interests.61 To reach this conclusion,
Justice White applied the balancing test for commercial speech de-
veloped in Central Hudson. Under that test, a regulation must fur-
ther a substantial governmental interest, directly advance that in-
terest, and reach no further than necessary to accomplish that
interest.6" Justice White acknowledged the importance of the city's
traffic safety and aesthetic interests and concluded that the ordi-
nance did not unduly restrict commercial speech because on-site
commercial signs were specificially exempted."s He expressed some
doubt as to whether a general prohibition against off-site advertis-
ing directly furthered the city's interests. However, he was careful
to state that the city's conclusions about the ill effects of billboards
were not manifestly unreasonable, and that he was unwilling to
substitute his judgment for that of the legislature."
In reviewing the impact of the ordinance on noncommercial
58. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 493, (1981).
59. Id. at 515-16.
60. Id. at 504-07.
61. Id. at 507-12. The plurality was balancing the city's asserted interests in traffic safety
and aesthetics against the right of the public to receive commercial information conveyed on
billboards.
62. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
63. 453 U.S. at 508.
64. Id. at 508-12.
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speech, however, the plurality found two defects of sufficient im-
portance to invalidate the entire ordinance."' First, the ordinance
gave greater protection to commercial speech than to noncommer-
cial speech. An owner of a building, said Justice White, could
maintain a sign with a commercial message on his premises, but
could not maintain that same sign if it carried a noncommercial
message." He found no support for the city's claim that such a
substantial restriction on noncommercial speech was justifiable.7
The second deficiency in the ordinance was that the twelve ex-
emptions for noncommercial off-site signs were based solely on
content."' Justice White explained that while a city may distin-
guish between the relative value of different categories of commer-
cial speech, it did-not have the same flexibility when noncommer-
cial speech was involved." The plurality held that the ordinance
was unconstitutional on its face because it reached too far in re-
stricting protected speech.7 °
Justices Brennan and Blackmun, in an opinion which concurred
with the plurality only in result, disagreed with Justice White's bi-
furcated approach. The concurring justices stated that if local gov-
ernments were able to pass separate regulations for commercial
and for noncommercial speech, local officials would be left with the
discretion to determine whether a particular message was commer-
cial or noncommercial.7 1 The two justices agreed with the plurality
that commercial speech should not be entitled to the same protec-
tion as noncommercial speech. However, they did not agree that
the differences between the two forms of speech compelled the
conclusion that local governments could be entrusted routinely
with the responsibility of categorizing speech for the purpose of
regulating it. 72
Justices Brennan and Blackmun also disagreed with the plural-
ity's characterization of the ordinance. They stated that the ordi-
nance was a complete ban on outdoor advertising signs .7 The exis-
65. Id. at 512-15.
66. Id. at 513.
67. Id. Justice White reasoned that the city was, in effect, deciding that an owner of an
on-site sign could communicate information about his goods and services, but could not
communicate his own ideas or the ideas of others.
68. Id. at 514-15.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 521.
71. Id. at 537-40.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 525-26.
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tence of a few exemptions, they added, did not change the overall
effect of the ordinance. Since the ordinance was a complete ban,
they said, it was unnecessary to engage in different balancing tests.
Under traditional first amendment analysis, a total ban could be
upheld only if the city showed that it had a compelling interest,
that the prohibition directly furthered the city's interest, and that
a less restrictive regulation would promote those interests less
well.7' The justices concluded that San Diego had failed to meet
this test and therefore the ordinance was unconstitutional. 5
Justice Stevens's opinion partially concurred with and partially
dissented from the plurality. Justice Stevens was alone in taking
the position that a city ought to be able to totally prohibit bill-
boards." For this reason he concurred with the portion of the plu-
rality opinion which upheld the ordinance as a commercial speech
regulation." However, he thought the plurality should not have
discussed the possible impact of the ordinance on on-site advertis-
ers who might wish to post signs with noncommercial messages.78
He stated that the plaintiff advertising companies did not have
standing to raise the issue of whether the distinction between on-
site and off-site signs was unconstitutional because the plaintiffs
only used off-site signs.7 Thus, he concluded that an overbreadth
argument such as the plurality used to invalidate the ordinance
was inappropriate under the facts of the case. 0
Justice Stevens stated that the issues for resolution were
whether the ordinance was designed to suppress unpopular ideas
and whether it left open alternative channels of communication."i
He found no hint of censorship and no indication that the elimina-
tion of billboards would inhibit the exchange of information of
ideas.8 2 The essential first amendment concern, said Justice Ste-
vens, is that a government not impose its viewpoint on the public
or select permissible topics for discussion.8" In the absence of ei-
ther of these concerns, he concluded, San Diego's ordinance should
74. Id. at 528.
75. Id. at 528-34.
76. Id. at 542.
77. Id. at 541.
78. Id. at 542, 543.
79. Id. at 544-48.
80. Id. at 548. See also supra note 20.
81. Id. at 552.
82. Id. at 552-55.
83. Id. at 553.
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be upheld."
Chief Justice Burger, in a separate dissent, stated that it did not
matter whether the Court viewed the ordinance as a total ban or as
a general prohibition with some exceptions. The two issues for res-
olution, he continued, were whether a local government might
eliminate certain billboards on the basis of aesthetics and safety,
and whether it might also determine that in some instances the
public's need for information outweighed the dangers perceived by
the legislature.85 He thought that the legislature's goals were im-
portant and that its conclusions about the ill effects of billboards
were reasonable.8 6 He agreed with Justice Stevens that the exemp-
tions were essentially neutral and allowed access to information of
public interest.8 7 The ordinance, he concluded, should have been
upheld.88
Chief Justice Burger also disagreed with the plurality's bifur-
cated balancing approach because it would require the Court to
distinguish between types of billboards solely on the basis of their
messages. He described this approach as both unsatisfactory and
unrealistic. It left governments with the choice of banning all bill-
boards or confining their prohibition to billboards with commercial
messages.8 9 The first alternative, he said, may not be constitu-
tional.90 The second alternative offered no practical solution, since
San Diego objected to the billboards themselves, not to the
messages they carried.91
Justice Rehnquist, in a third dissent, criticized the Court's in-
ability to articulate a set of guidelines or to explain how the first
amendment should be applied at the local level.9 The only issue
the Court had to decide, he said, was whether the aesthetic justifi-
cation was sufficient, by itself, to sustain a total prohibition.93 In
his opinion, it was." He added that city officials were entitled to
more deference than the Court had shown in this case; local offi-
cials should not be forced to justify and prove that the elimination
84. Id. at 555.
85. Id. at 557.
86. Id. at 559-61.
87. Id. at 564-66.
88. Id. at 563.
89. Id. at 564.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 569-70.
93. Id. at 570.
94. Id.
[Vol. 13
Metromedia Case
of billboards was necessary to improve the appearance of their
city."
ANALYSIS
The five Metromedia opinions highlight the tension which exists
between the Court's recent treatment of commercial speech and
the traditional rules and doctrines it has developed in the context
of noncommercial speech. Absent a clear definition of the distinct
characteristics which set commercial speech apart from all other
speech, the Metromedia opinions indicate that more harm than
good is done to first amendment principles by giving commercial
speech a semi-protected status. The five opinions raise doubts
about the effectiveness of content neutrality as a check on poten-
tial abuse of discretion by governments. The opinions also call into
question the effectiveness of the Court's own balancing tests.
Content Neutrality
The principle that commercial speech merits less protection than
noncommercial speech is directly at odds with the principle that
restrictions on protected speech be made without regard to con-
tent. Ordinarily, the Court requires that a regulation on protected
speech be content neutral." In part, this requirement insures that
a government will not use a regulation to suppress unpopular views
or inhibit the free exchange of information or ideas.97 It also re-
flects the belief that there is an "equality of status in the field of
ideas."98 However, by granting commercial speech a semi-protected
status, the Court acknowledges that not all kinds of protected
speech will be treated equally. Thus, the two principles are
inconsistent.
Recognizing this inconsistency, some members of the Court have
whittled away at the doctrine of content neutrality and sometimes
equivocated over the extent of protection that it affords. In
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association," the Court upheld Ohio's
attorney anti-solicitation statute against a challenge that the stat-
ute impermissibly regulated commercial speech solely on the basis
of content. The Court stated that content-based regulation of com-
95. Id.
96. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
98. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
99. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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mercial speech was justified because commercial speech held a
"subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values."100
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,0 1 a case decided during the
same term as Ohralik, the Court upheld the right of the FCC to
regulate indecent broadcasts. In one portion of his plurality opin-
ion, Justice Stevens, joined only by Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tice Rehnquist, stated that the requirement of content-free regula-
tion was not an absolute mandated by the Constitution.102 Justice
Stevens viewed the Court's treatment of commercial speech as evi-
dence that content-based regulation was generally permissible, not
only with respect to speech that "does no more than propose a
commercial transaction,"10 3 but also with respect to indecent
speech.'"
The plurality opinion in Metromedia marks a further departure
from the strict application of the content neutrality doctrine, be-
yond either Pacifica of Ohralik. In both those cases, the govern-
mental regulations were using content as a basis for distinguishing
between protected and unprotected speech. In contrast, the plural-
ity's analysis in Metromedia used content as a basis for distin-
guishing between two types of protected speech. By separately con-
sidering the effect of San Diego's ordinance on commercial and
noncommercial speech, the plurality was able to hold that a prohi-
bition on off-site commercial billboards was permissible.108 The
plurality reasoned that this holding was consistent with the fact
that commercial speech is only partially protected by the first
amendment.10
Until the plurality's decision in Metromedia, the doctrine of
content neutrality would have hampered a government's ability to
distinguish between types of protected speech. Presumably, a local
100. Id. at 456.
101. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
102. Id. at 743.
103. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 386
(1973).
104. 438 U.S. at 747-48.
105. Under the plurality's reasoning, a court would be required to examine the content
of the speech being regulated. Although courts traditionally have had to look to content to
detemine whether a particular type of speech is protected or unprotected, they have never
been in the position of deciding whether a particular type of speech is deserving of more or
less protection under the first amendment.
106. Presumably, the plurality was referring not only to Central Hudson, but also to
cases such as Bates and Friedman, which also had placed limitations on the scope of com-
mercial speech protection. See supra note 38.
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government still may not discriminate among types of noncommer-
cial speech without being subjected to a strict standard of re-
view.107 However, consistent with the plurality's analysis in Me-
tromedia, a government may pass content-based regulations on
commercial speech without being subjected to this strict standard
of review. 10 8 Also, in the course of enforcing such regulations, a
government will have the authority to routinely determine whether
a particular form of speech is within the scope of its regulation.,"
This determination will be made on the basis of the content of the
speech."10
The difficulties with giving governmental officials the authority
to routinely categorize protected speech may not have been appar-
ent in the commercial speech cases decided prior to Metromedia.
In Ohralik, for example, the content-based regulation distin-
guished between protected commercial speech and unprotectbd
commercial speech."' In Virginia Pharmacy, Linmark, and Cen-
tral Hudson, the content-based regulations involved specific bans
on specific categories of protected commercial speech." 2 In none of
these four cases was there any indication that noncommercial
speech was affected.
After Metromedia, however, both commercial and noncommer-
cial speech could be affected. The fact that noncommercial speech
107. This conclusion is consistent with the plurality's application of the strict standard
of review, which it used in considering the effect of San Diego's ordinance on noncommercial
speech. 453 U.S. at 512-15.
108. The plurality's bifurcated approach supports this conclusion, because the justices
used the Central Hudson test to uphold San Diego's ordinance as a valid content-based
restriction on commercial speech.
109. If, for example, a government passed a billboard ordinance which only prohibited
signs with commercial messages, government officials would be left with the task of decid-
ing, in each individual instance, whether a particular message was commercial and therefore
prohibited, or noncommercial and therefore permissible. Justices Brennan and Blackmun
stressed this point in their concurring opinion in Metromedia. They argued that so long as
the line between ideological and commercial speech remains unclear, local officials should
not be given the opportunity to routinely decide whether a particular form of speech is
commercial or noncommercial. The justices concluded that such an approach "presents a
real danger of curtailing noncommercial speech in the guise of regulating commercial
speech." 453 U.S. at 536-37.
110. Ironically, the doctrine of content neutrality was developed to avoid exactly this
type of situation. See, e.g., cases cited supra at note 19.
111. 436 U.S. 447. In Ohralik, the statute distinguished between attorney advertising
and attorney solicitation.
112. In Virginia Pharmacy, the statute prohibited price advertising of prescription
drugs. In Linmark, the posting of for-sale signs was prohibited. Central Hudson involved a
prohibition against promotional advertising.
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was involved in Metromedia is critical because after that case a
city could presumably prohibit only billboards with commercial
messages. It would then be able to examine the content of every
billboard message to determine whether or not the message was
commercial. The danger with such an approach comes from assum-
ing that the classifications might be simple and straightforward.
Despite the plurality's assurance that the difference between com-
mercial and noncommercial speech is a matter of "common
sense,"11s this may not prove to be the case in practice. If it is not,
then there may be no adequate means of insuring that a govern-
ment acts in a nondiscriminatory fashion."
As objectionable as the plurality's analysis may seem in terms of
traditional first amendment law, the dissenting justices offer an ap-
proach which may be more offensive to traditional first amend-
ment principles. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens, in their
discussions of the statutory exemptions to the sign ordinance, ar-
gued that the exemptions did not violate the first amendment.115
Although they agreed that the exemptions were based on content,
they found that all were neutral in substance. Both justices stated
that the alleged violation of content neutrality was, at most, a
technical violation, since none of the exemptions favored particular
viewpoints or threatened freedom of expression. " '
The approach taken by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens
suggests that content neutrality may be at most a relative rule.
Their approach also suggests that governments may legitimately
regulate protected speech on the basis of content. If the require-
113. 453 U.S. at 506.
114. Traditionally, the doctrines of content neutrality, vagueness, and overbreadth were
applied to insure that regulations on speech were narrowly drawn and did not unduly re-
strict protected speech. The overbreadth doctrine, however, is not available in commercial
speech cases. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977). The content neu-
trality doctrine will be of limited effectiveness if governments are able to routinely distin-
guish between protected noncommercial speech and protected commercial speech. The
vagueness doctrine may also prove inadequate so long as commercial speech is not defined
with any certainty. This is particularly true since the Court's definitions have been far from
explicit in terms of distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial speech. See
supra note 8.
115. 453 U.S. at 553-55. (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 564-66 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
116. Justice Stevens stated that the first amendment protects against a government im-
posing its viewpoint on the public or selecting permissible topics for public debate. Id. at
553. He concluded that none of the exemptions for noncommercial speech contained in the
ordinance related to either of these concerns. Chief Justice Burger agreed, describing the
exemptions as "narrowly tailored to peculiar public needs." He concluded that the exemp-
tions did not "remotely endanger freedom of speech" and accused the plurality of trivializ-
ing first amendment values. Id. at 564-65.
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ment of content neutrality is a mere technicality, then courts will
be left with the discretion of whether or not to enforce it. At best
this approach is unpredictable; at worst, it leaves governments
with wide discretion to control the free exercise of first amendment
rights.11
First Amendment Balancing Tests
All five of the Metromedia opinions reflect a concern about the
potentially formidable barrier that the first amendment could cre-
ate against legitimate commercial regulation. The concern was ex-
pressed in a variety of ways, ranging from sympathetic acknowl-
edgment of the "unique aspects of billboards" to unquestioning
acceptance of the city's aesthetic interests."18 The Court's sensitiv-
ity to underlying policy considerations, however, has the unfortu-
nate consequence of readjusting first amendment rules and tests
and of undermining traditional first amendment values. The
Court's treatment of the content neutrality doctrine is one exam-
ple. Its relaxed standards of review are another.
An element shared by the three dissenting justices in Me-
tromedia was a reluctance to resort to first amendment tests and
rules. While the plurality and the two concurring justices took
pains to categorize the ordinance as either a complete ban or as a
general prohibition and then to apply one or more first amendment
tests, the dissenting justices avoided such labeling. Each framed
the issues in the case in a different way, and each resolved them
differently."'
117. The Court's previous treatment of content-based regulations and of regulations
which were overly broad or vague expressed a concern for precisely this issue. See, e.g.,
supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. If strict application of the content neutrality
doctrine is no longer necessary, there is little to distinguish the time, place, and manner test
from the stricter balancing test.
118. The plurality in Metromedia emphasized the fact that billboards present a unique
set of problems for land-use planning and development. 453 U.S. at 502. Justices Brennan
and Blackmun willingly acknowledged that the elimination of billboards would enhance cer-
tain areas of a city. Id. at 530. Justice Stewart drew an analogy between billboards and
graffiti. Id. at 549-50. Chief Justice Burger described billboards as unattractive, dangerous
and distinguishable from other types of speech because of their "superficial sloganeering."
Id. at 557. Justice Rehnquist also acknowledged the unsightliness of billboards. Id. at 570.
119. Justice Stevens concentrated on the fact that billboards are only one means of com-
municating information and ideas, and that a prohibition on billboards would only reduce
the quantity of communication, not the quality. He compared the regulation of communica-
tions to the regulation of the economic market to suggest that curtailing the quantity of
communications might have a salutary effect on the quality of ideas and information. Id. at
548-53.
Chief Justice Burger focused on a local government's authority under its police powers to
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For the dissenting justices, the fact that speech was involved was
incidental. In their view, San Diego was concerned about the phys-
ical nature of billboards, not about the messages the billboards car-
ried. While this approach may reflect reality, it downplays the fact
that the city's ordinance did affect first amendment interests. The
dissenting justices may be correct in concluding that the first
amendment is being interpreted too broadly. However, this is not a
sufficient justification for treating a prohibition on protected
speech as something less than what it is and subjecting it to only a
cursory first amendment analysis.1 2 0
In contrast to the dissenters, Justices Brennan and Blackmun, in
their concurring opinion, emphasized an analysis which fit within
the bounds of traditional first amendment law. By categorizing the
ordinance as a total prohibition on outdoor advertising, they elimi-
nated the possibility of applying the time, place, and manner test.
This conclusion compelled them to use the stricter balancing test
traditionally applied to content-based prohibitions.121 Unlike the
plurality, they did not look to the type of speech involved and con-
sequently did not evaluate the separate effects of the ordinance on
commercial and noncommercial speech.1 22
Although the two justices used the strict test rather than the
plurality's intermediate balancing test for commercial speech, lan-
guage in their concurring opinion suggests that they might be will-
ing, at least in some instances, to relax the traditionally strict scru-
pass regulations which enhance the safety and beauty of the community. He emphasized
that San Diego's ordinance was essentially directed at billboards, not at the messages they
carried and therefore the first amendment was not directly implicated. Id. at 559-63. Justice
Rehnquist stated that the only issue for resolution was whether aesthetics was a sufficient
justification for banning billboards. He did not discuss first amendment doctrines or balanc-
ing tests, concluding only that the limited exemptions for noncommercial speech did not
render the ordinance unconsititutional. Id. at 570.
120. The dissenting justices dealt with the first amendment issue only in relation to
whether the selective exemptions indicated a desire to favor particular ideas or to suppress
particular topics. Chief Justice Burger focused on the legitimacy of San Diego's classifica-
tions, not on the larger question of whether a ban on a form of protected communication
violated the first amendment. Justices Stevens and Rehnquist thought a ban on a form of
communication should be allowed, but their conclusions were not based on any first amend-
ment balancing test. Instead, they emphasized the importance of the city's traffic safety and
aesthetic objectives.
121. 453 U.S. at 528. See also supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
122. The analysis used by Justices Brennan and Blackmun reflects the traditional ap-
proach. It is quite different from the analysis used by the plurality because it does not
require distinguishing between types of protected speech. See also supra notes 45-48 and
accompanying text which discusses the concurring opinions of Justices Brennan, Blackmun
and Stevens in Central Hudson.
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tiny standard of review."'3 They suggested that if San Diego had
demonstrated a greater commitment to improve the industrial and
commercial areas, they too might have found that San Diego's aes-
thetic interests were of sufficient importance to justify a ban on
billboards. 124 Thus, there is a possibility that the strict balancing
test might be applied in a slightly more deferential manner when
regulations on commercial speech are being reviewed. Although
such an approach would be an indirect means of acknowledging
the lesser status of commercial speech, it has the potential for un-
dermining the effectiveness of the traditional "strict scrutiny" bal-
ancing test. There is a possibility that the standard of this test
might be relaxed not only for commercial speech regulations, but
also for various local government regulations intended to promote
a variety of nebulous interests, ranging from aesthetics to the pub-
lic welfare.
The bifurcated approach used by the plurality in Metromedia
represents another means of offsetting the consequences of includ-
ing commercial speech within the protection of the first amend-
ment. In effect, the plurality creates a subcategory of first amend-
ment law, exclusively for commercial speech. Under the plurality's
approach, the deferential time, place, and manner test would still
be applied to uphold regulations on commercial speech which are
content neutral.125 If, however, a regulation on commercial speech
is content-based, a court is no longer compelled to use the stricter
test normally applied to regulations based on content. Instead, it
123. The two justices seemed primarily concerned with matters of proof rather than with
the legitimacy of San Diego's asserted interests. For example, Justice Brennan stated that
he had "no quarrel with the substantiality of the city's interest in traffic safety," but he
added that the city had offered no evidence to support its conclusion that billboards actu-
ally impaired traffic safety. 453 U.S. at 528-30. Similarly, in discussing the city's aesthetics
argument, Justice Brennan explained: "Of course, it is not for a court to impose its own
notion of beauty on San Diego. But before deferring to a city's judgment, a court must be
convinced that the city is seriously and comprehensively addressing aesthetic concerns with
respect to its environment." Id. at 531.
124. Justice Brennan explicitly stated what he believed was necessary to establish a
valid argument for prohibiting billboards on the basis of aesthetics. "By showing a compre-
hensive commitment to making its physical environment in commercial and industrial areas
more attractive, and by allowing only narrowly tailored exceptions, if any, San Diego could
demonstrate that its interest in creating an aesthetically pleasing environment is genuine
and substantial." Id. at 532-33. He emphasized that a city would not need to address all
aesthetic problems at once. However, because first amendment rights were at stake, Justice
Brennan stated that a city would have to show that its commitment to aesthetics went be-
yond simply banning billboards. Id. at 531-32.
125. The plurality considered this test in Metromedia, but rejected it because the ex-
emptions for off-site noncommercial signs were based on content. See supra note 53.
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may apply the new, intermediate level balancing test developed in
Central Hudson and liberally expanded in application by the plu-
rality in Metromedia.126
The intermediate level balancing test is clearly intended to allow
various governmental units greater flexibility in regulating com-
mercial speech. The question, however, is whether the new stan-
dard will be workable. In practical terms, the new test may be diffi-
cult to apply, particularly when elements of commercial speech
and noncommercial speech are combined.12 7 Courts may be forced
to focus on problems of definition in an effort to articulate the dif-
ferences between protected noncommercial speech and protected
commercial speech. 26
126. The traditional strict first amendment test requires a government to show that it
has a compelling interest in restricting speech; that the restriction directly furthers its inter-
est; and that any more narrowly drawn restriction would promote less well its interest. This
was the test applied by Justices Brennan and Blackmun in Metromedia. 453 U.S. at 528. In
contrast, the Central Hudson test requires a government to show that it has a substantial
interest; that the restriction directly advances that interest; and that the restriction reaches
no further than necessary to accomplish that interest. 447 U.S. at 566. As the plurality in
Metromedia indicated, this test is easier to satisfy, for doubts may be resolved in favor of
the government. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
The plurality's application of the Central Hudson test is more expansive for two reasons.
First, the justices used the test to differentiate between protected commercial speech and
protected noncommercial speech; second, they clearly intended that the test should be
viewed as an intermediate level balancing test, rather than an alternative balancing test to
be applied only when commercial speech regulations are involved. The differences are criti-
cal, because the plurality has, essentially, established tiers for levels of protected speech.
The sole basis for their approach is that commercial speech is not entitled to the same
protection as noncommercial speech.
127. Several recent law review articles have focused on the problem of how to distinguish
between commercial speech and noncommercial speech. The authors indicate that the dis-
tinction may be a difficult one to make. See, e.g., Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1976); Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw.
U.L. REv. 372 (1979); Jackson & Jefferies, Commercial Speech, Economic Due Process, and
the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979); Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protec-
tion and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HAxv. L. REv. 661 (1977); Comment, First
Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44
U. CHL L. REv. 205 (1976). See generally Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the
Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. Rav. 1 (1976); Meiklejohn, Commercial Speech and the
First Amendment, 13 CAL. W.L. REV. 430 (1977); Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doc-
trine in the U.S. Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080; Schiros, Commercial Speech: The
Demise of a Chimera, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 45.
128. Problems of definition may account, in large part, for the Court's decision to over-
rule Chrestensen. The cases cited supra in note 28 give some indication of the difficulty the
Court has had in trying to decide cases in which aspects of commercial and noncommercial
expression are combined. Courts will be faced with a similar dilemma if they are forced to
distinguish between protected commercial speech and protected noncommercial speech in
order to apply the proper balancing test.
1982] Metromedia Case
If, after Metromedia, it is possible for a city to prohibit billboard
companies from advertising commercial messages, it seems at least
plausible that a city might also be able to prohibit other forms of
unwelcome enterprises simply by labeling them as commercial. In
the past, for example, governments often have been frustrated in
their attempts to restrict various forms of sexually explicit en-
tertainment, because the Court regarded these types of expression
as protected speech. 2' An argument, however, could be made that
since these types of expression have a commercial as well as a non-
commercial purpose, they could be classified as commercial speech.
If a government were able to classify these forms of expression as
commercial, it might be far more successful in regulating them 13 0
The theoretical difficulties with the plurality's approach may
prove to be at least as great as the practical difficulties. In effect,
the intermediate level balancing test creates tiers of preferred
speech."1 In the past, the Court has interpreted the first amend-
129. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 81 (1981)(ban on live nude
dancing), Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (films with nudity), South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975)(ban on rock musical "Hair").
130. A recent opinion by a Massachusetts appellate court illustrates the manner in
which the plurality's two-tier approach may be used to uphold billboard prohibitions under
an intermediate level of scrutiny. In Maurice Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising
Bd., 427 N.E.2d 25 (Mass. App. 1981), a billboard owner brought suit to challenge the con-
stitutionality of a town by-law similar to the ordinance struck down in Metromedia. The
law prohibited virtually all off-site billboards, including pre-existing signs, on the basis of
aesthetics and traffic safety. First, the court held that the billboard owner only had standing
to raise a commercial speech argument because he used his signs solely for commercial pur-
poses. Then, using the Central Hudson test, the court concluded that the ordinance must be
upheld. Id. at 28-29.
131. If commercial speech is entitled to only semi-protected status, it seems reasonable
to expect that other types of protected speech might also be assigned various tiers of protec-
tion. In this regard, Justice Stevens's comments in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50 (1976) are instructive. In Young the Court upheld an anti-skid-row ordinance
that regulated the location of adult movie theaters. Writing for the plurality, Justice Ste-
vens concluded:
[Elven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the total
suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it is mani-
fest that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly dif-
ferent, and lesser magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political de-
bate. . . . Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to
applaud or to despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand why our duty
to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us would march our
sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sex-
ual Activities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice. Even though the First
Amendment protects communication in this area from total suppression, we hold
that the State may legitimately use the context of these materials as the basis for
placing them in a different classification from other motion pictures.
Id. at 70-71.
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ment as preventing governments from distinguishing between
types of protected speech solely on the basis of content. If, how-
ever, the first amendment is to be read as preferring certain types
of speech over others, then the constitutional protection afforded
by the free speech clause will depend, in part, upon the value of
the speech. Ironically, in seeking to safeguard the protections af-
forded to noncommercial, ideological speech, the plurality in Me-
tromedia may have undermined the basic principles upon which
the first amendment is based.
CONCLUSION
If Metromedia were restricted to its facts, perhaps it could be
dismissed as an aberration. Unfortunately, it has implications
which go beyond the issue of billboard regulation. First, several of
the opinions cast doubt upon the importance of content neutrality,
either as a barrier to regulation or as a viable standard. Second, a
majority of the justices seem willing, either directly or indirectly,
to view the first amendment as something less than a guarantee
that protected speech will be treated equally.
The five Metromedia opinions indicate that there are serious
difficulties with broadening the scope of the first amendment to
include commercial speech. If the differences between commercial
speech and noncommercial speech are so significant, then perhaps
the better method of reviewing regulations which affect both types
of speech is under the equal protection or due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment rather than the free speech clause of the
first amendment. The language of the first amendment is unequiv-
ocal. If the values which it seeks to protect are interpreted too
broadly or qualified too often, then its effectiveness as a barrier
against suppression will be destroyed.
ELIZABETH H. CAMERON
It is worth noting not only Justice Steven's conclusion that the first amendment protects
speech in varying degrees, but also his decision to resort to equal protection analysis rather
than first amendment analysis to uphold a content-based classification on speech. If the
Court determines that governments ought to be able to differentiate between types of pro-
tected speech, then equal protection analysis may prove to be a more effective means of
reviewing such regulations. For an example of how the Court has applied equal protection
analysis to a restriction involving advertising, see Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York
336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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